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Abstract- Security is one major issue with RFID technology. 
Mainstream research in RFID security addresses the following 
security properties i.e. anonymity, confidentiality and 
authenticity, however it does not cater for integrity. In this paper 
we consider the fourth security property i.e. integrity. We try to 
solve the issue of data recovery after RFID data has been 
tampered. To address this issue, we present a novel 
steganographic solution, which embeds a secret pattern in the 
serial number partition of the RFID tag. This secret pattern is the 
data that we assume would most likely be the candidate for 
tampering, for example the manufacturer’s and products details 
stored on the RFID tag. The main motivation for an attacker to 
tamper this data would be economic benefits like low logistics 
cost, or quicker custom clearance, and this can only be achieved 
by changing product details or manufacturer details on the RFID 
tag. The novelty of this scheme lies in the fact that we have 
applied steganographic principles to RFID tags; in comparison, 
most of the existing steganographic solutions are limited to 
images, or audio, or video applications. We term this scheme 
ResTamp because it is restores tampered data. This paper provides 
a detailed theoretical foundation for the ResTamp algorithm. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A RFID tag is an electronic device that holds identification 
data. Typically, the RFID tag is attached to items and contains 
a serial number, which is used to uniquely identify them. RFID 
technology uses radio waves to automatically identify items 
which have RFID tags attached to it.  
This technology was initially developed with the aim to 
manage and track items in supply chain and logistics, but 
nowadays it is used in many other areas e.g. medical 
applications, manufacturing, retail, livestock tracking and 
tracking exact timing in sports events. As pointed out by 
RFIDExchange “RFID applications are limited only by 
imagination” [22]. It can be used any where and every where if 
possible.  
RFID technology is composed of three main components; 
firstly, a RFID tag, which contains the identification number, 
secondly, a RFID Reader, which activates the tag to broadcast 
its identification number and finally, a RFID Middleware, 
which integrates the information from the reader to the 
backend database systems [16, 17]. This is shown in Fig. 1.  
However at present, the main issues with RFID technology 
privacy, security, cost, reliability, deployment, and scalability. 
Several proposals have been put forward to solve these issues. 
Within the security umbrella, there are several open issues. 
One such issue is data tampering. If the data stored on the 
RFID tag is tampered, then the tag becomes useless, because it 
cannot convey any information. This is a major security 
concern. An initial proposal for tamper detection was proposed 
by Potdar, Wu and Chang (2005). However this solution only 
addresses the issue partially, because the tampered data cannot 
be recovered, it can only be quarantined to prevent its entry to 
the backend databases and ERP (Enterprise Resource 
Planning) systems.  
In this paper we extend this work, by presenting a solution to 
recover tampered data from a collection of RFID tags, after 
data tampering has been confirmed. The proposed solution is 
based on the concepts derived from information hiding and 
steganography.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we survey 
the existing literature on RFID security. In Section 3, we 
formalize the problem description. In Section 4, we propose 
the data recovery solution. In Section 5, we provide a 
discussion and conclude the paper in Section 6.  
 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
While researchers are just starting to address security 
questions, privacy advocates and legislators have for some 
time been attempting to address the privacy issues. A lot of 
work has been done to address the privacy issues in RFID 
deployment; however literature addressing the security issues 
is quite limited. The main aim of this section is to discuss the 
 
Fig. 1 RFID Architecture 
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security issues in RFID systems and survey the relevant 
literature that is proposed to address the same. 
Wong and Raphael (2006) classify attacks on RFID systems 
into two categories – passive attacks and active attacks. 
Passive attackers are those who eavesdrop on the 
communications channel, but do not affect or interfere with the 
communication in any way [27]. Passive attacks compromise 
the confidentiality and anonymity in communication. Consider 
the warehouse management scenario, if a malicious reader can 
eavesdrop (spy) the communication between the tags and the 
readers, confidentiality and anonymity in such communication 
is lost because the entity involved in the communication is 
unaware when it is being attacked.  
Active attackers are those who directly interfere with the 
communication of messages, either by interrupting, fabricating 
or modifying communicated messages [27]. Active attacks 
compromise the availability, authenticity and integrity in 
communication. Interruptions refer to denial of service attacks 
(availability) on RFID tags. Engberg, Harning, and Jensen 
(2004), argued that if such an attack is launched, the RFID 
reader cannot query the tags which could have an adverse 
effect on a warehouse management system (or related 
applications) as it may stop responding and real-time status of 
the warehouse cannot be made available [4].   
Fabrication refers to attacks on the authenticity of the 
information on the RFID tag, such as tag forgery. RFID tags 
might be forged in order to get access to restricted locations 
within an organization.  
Modifications refer to attacks on the integrity of the 
information on the RFID tag (or system) such as data 
tampering. Data on the RFID tag could also be tampered with 
by malicious readers. Consider the warehouse scenario once 
again: if the data on the tag is tampered with, it could result in 
shipping wrong items from the warehouse. For instance, if the 
malicious reader changes the information on RFID tag from 
Orange to Apple, then a palette containing Apples might be 
shipped when the intention was to ship Oranges. Data 
tampering (or integrity) can raise issues like QoS (Quality of 
Service) and Trust in logistics and supply chain and hence 
needs to be addressed thoroughly.  
We now discuss the current literature which addresses some 
of the security issues highlighted in the Fig. 2. Most of the 
proposed solutions discussed here address the first four 
security properties i.e. confidentiality, availability, authenticity 
and anonymity. We begin the discussion with solutions to 
manage anonymity.  
A. Anonymity 
RFID technology shows the characteristics that can invade 
personal privacy; hence anonymity is highly desired if this 
technology would be deployed in mass scale. A lot of work has 
already been conducted in this area and several proposals are 
put forward to address the issue of privacy [6, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 
14, 17, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27]. In this section, we discuss several 
approaches that can be used to provide consumer privacy.  
One of the simplest approaches to address the issue of 
privacy is to kill the tag once it leaves the supply chain and 
enters the consumer market. This approach is used by EPC 
standard, which make the tags permanently inoperative. It is 
envisioned that the point-of-sale (POS) operator would have 
RFID reader that can send the command to kill the tag once it 
is sold to the consumer. However, to address the issue of 
malicious tag writes, the kill command is protected by a secret 
PIN, which in this case is assumed to be with the POS RFID 
reader. Another approach is to add a RFID tag on the price tag. 
Hence, when the price tag is removed, the RFID is removed as 
well and can guarantee privacy. However, as pointed out by 
Juels (2005), removing or killing the tags can restrict the post 
purchase benefits of RFID tags like receiptless item returns 
[11]. As a result, it would be useful if the tags could be 
temporarily deactivated. This could be achieved by access 
control mechanisms similar like using a PIN. Several other 








Using two tags – one for unique identification and other for 
product details. Does not address clandestine inventorying 




Re-encrypting the tag content using El-Gamal cryptosystem. 
The solution is presented in the context of securing RFID 





Blocker Tags: A tag that specifies whether it can be read or 
not. A privacy bit (0 or 1) is assigned on the tag, which 
determines whether the tag can be publicly scanned (bit 0) 






Proposed to use bilinear pairing in elliptic curve 
cryptography. Authenticity of the tag identifier is 
maintained by digitally signing the ciphertext with a trusted 
CA. This approach cannot address the issue of ciphertext 
swapping, i.e. when eavesdropper changes the content of 
two RFID tags simultaneously by swapping their content.  
Rakesh 
Kumar 
A Faraday cage is an enclosure designed to exclude 
electromagnetic fields. As a result, certain radio frequencies 
cannot penetrate through it. It can address privacy concerns, 
e.g. if high values currency notes start embedding a RFID 
tag, then using foil lined wallets can guarantee privacy 
 
B. Confidentiality 
Several approaches to access control are proposed in the 
literature. We will discuss a few of the approaches in greater 
detail in this section.  
Juels, Rivest and Szydlo (2003), discuss a hash based Access 
Control Protocol [13]. Here the tag is first in a locked state. 
When the tag moves to the unlocked state the reader can access 
the tags details. In order to change the state the tag first 
 
 
Fig. 2 Major Security Issues with RFID Adoption 
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transmits Meta ID’ which is the hash value of a key. An 
authorized reader looks up the corresponding key in a backend 
system and sends it to the tag. The tag verifies the key by 
hashing it, returns the clear text ID, and remains only for a 
short time in an ‘unlocked’ state which provides time for 
reader authentication and offers a modest level of access 
security. 
C. Authenticity 
The literature on the authentication of the RFID tag is also 
very mature as of today. Several proposals are presented in the 
domain of tag authentication, reader authentication, and anti-






Juels 2005 PIN: Authenticate the tag to the reader 
Juels 2004  Yoking Proofs – provides cryptographic proofs that two 
tags were scanned simultaneously and in physical 
proximity. Can be used in a pharmacy to prove to a 
government agency that the pharmacy scanned a RFID 
tagged medicine bottle and delivered the exact medicine 
as prescribed on the RFID tagged prescription  
Engberg et al. 
(2004)  
Zero-knowledge based protocols for communication 
between reader and tag so that they can authenticate 
each other without revealing any secrets that may allow 
them to be tracked. 
Molnar & 
Wagner, 2004  
Mutual authentication schemes using challenge-
response based on the use of pseudo-random function in 
the computation of responses to challenges.  
Feldhofer et 
al., 2004 
Proposes the Simple Authentication and Security Layer 




Provides forward secrecy by using nonces (random 
numbers that are never reused) by both the reader and 
tag in their challenges to each other. 
 
This concludes the survey of the most relevant literature on 
RFID security. We observed that most of the solutions 
addressed the issue of authentication, confidentiality and 
anonymity. Existing solutions do not address the issue of data 
integrity of the RFID tag in detail.  
III. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION 
Data tampering and data recovery are the two major security 
concerns in RFID deployment. Any solution that can address 
these issues i.e. to detect that data tampering has happened and 
to provide a mechanism to recover the tampered data would be 
very significant, whenever large and complex RFID based 
solutions require security and authenticity.  
One good example would be e-logistics and e-Warehouse 
where consortia of small to medium enterprises (SME) around 
the world work together to share businesses, customers, 
resources and goods tracking to provide just-in-time customer 
services. Such a virtual collaborative environment survives on 
the assumption of reliable and authentic information. 
Automatic identification technology provided by RFID heavily 
relies on the authenticity of the information. If this information 
is tampered, it can destroy the reputation of the businesses 
collaborating in the virtual environment. In distributed logistics 
networks and extended enterprises, collaborating peers could 
accuse each other for being vulnerable to security attacks 
which may reduce their trustworthiness, and eventually such a 
collaborative environment would not sustain any longer. For 
example, if the data on the RFID tag representing the ‘nature 
of good’ were changed from ‘Mangoes’ to ‘Oranges’ wrong 
goods would be shipped to wrong customers, which would in 
turn affect the reputation of the logistics provider. Such acts 
could be organized by competitive organization in an attempt 
to thwart the reputation of logistics providers. 
This demonstrates the need for solutions, which can offer 
tamper detection and data recovery after tampering has been 
identified. Initial work on tamper detection was presented by 
the authors earlier [19, 20, 21, 28]. However after conducting a 
detailed literature survey of RFID security solutions we 
identified that no one has yet presented a solution to address 
the issue of data recovery after data tampering. This gives us 
the rationale to present our solution for data recovery after data 
tampering, which is based on the principles of information 
hiding and steganography.  
 
IV. PROPOSED DATA RECOVERY SCHEME – RESTAMP  
In this section, we give a general overview of ResTamp 
(pronounced as Re-stamp) solution, followed by eliciting the 
main requirements for ResTamp. Based on these requirements 
the design rationale for ResTamp is outlined where we discuss 
the basic design decisions. 
A. General Overview of the ResTamp Solution 
ResTamp offers a steganographic solution to recover 
tampered RFID data. The proposed solution relies on [19, 21], 
to ascertain that data tampering has occurred and to identify 
which portion of the RFID tag that has been tampered with. In 
the proposed ResTamp solution, we assume that only the EPC 
Manager (EM) and the Object Class (OC) would be tampered. 
This is because we assume the intentional attack or the 
tampering attempt, has been driven by economic motives, like 
reduced transportation cost or easier entry at overseas ports. 
And the only way to achieve this is by modifying the EM or 
the OC component of the RFID data structure1. For example, 
OC is used to uniquely identify one product; if product A 
(Orange) has cheaper transportation cost compared to product 
B (Mango), the attacker might attempt to change OC of 
product B, to gain an economic benefit. However if the 
attacker changes the serial number (SN), which is used to 
identify one item of a specific product, it cannot gain any 
economic benefit, because SN does not represent a product, but 
just a unique identifier for a item belonging to one product.  
                                                        
1 RFID data structure is composed of four partitions – Header, EPC 
Manager (EM), Object Class (OC) and Serial Number (SN). EM uniquely 
identifies a manufacturer globally, OC identifies one product manufactured by 
one manufacturer i.e. EM and SN identifies one unique item belonging to one 
product. A detailed explanation can be found here [19,20,21]. 
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To achieve data recovery, ResTamp embeds a secret pattern, 
generated by using EM and OC, within the SN partition of all 
RFID tags belonging to one product or a consignment.  This 
embedded pattern is used by the data recovery module to 
generate the tampered data. This is done in the following 
manner: suppose the secret pattern is n bits long, we embed m 
bits in each RFID tag. Hence a total of [n/m] RFID tags would 
be used to hide the secret pattern generated using EM and OC. 
If we assume m = 1, then the first bit is embedded in the RFID 
tag which has the lowest serial number. As shown in Table 32, 
the RFID tag with the serial number ‘1111112345’ would be used 
to hide the first bit of the secret pattern. In the similar manner 
all the other bits in the secret pattern would be added to the 
remaining RFID tags. If the secret pattern was represented by 7 
bits as ‘1010101’, the corresponding bits in the RFID tag 
would be changes as shown in Table 3. In Table 3, we used the 
3rd most significant bit (MSB) of the SN to hide the secret 
pattern. All the numbers with a bold and underlined facing 
when combined together would represent the secret pattern. 
 
TABLE 3 
SAMPLE RFID SERIAL NUMBERS 










When the EM or OC is tampered, we can recover the 
original values by resorting to the embedded pattern in the SN 
partition. The detailed algorithm is explained later.  
The functionality for embedding of the secret pattern is 
assumed to be present in the RFID reader which initially writes 
the tags, whereas the extraction algorithm is assumed to be 
available as a component which can be plugged in the RFID 
middleware applications. The ResTamp solution would be a 
                                                        
2 Example of 8 RFID tags and their serial numbers are as shown in Table 3. 
Consider the SN in decimal for easier understanding, although in reality these 
are represented using binary or hexadecimal.   
part of the tamper detection component in the RFID 
middleware and is shown in Fig. 3.  
This component takes input data from the data management 
layer, and then detects whether EM or OC is tampered. If it is 
tampered then the secret pattern is extracted using all the RFID 
tags used for embedding the secret. The tampered data can then 
be restored and then propagated to the application integration 
levels in the middleware architecture. 
B. Requirements for ResTamp Solution 
 
In order to address the issues of data tampering, the 
following requirements are laid for the proposed TamDetect 
solution. 
1. Length of Secret Pattern: The length of the secret pattern 
should be less than or equal to the total number of bits 
available in one set of RFID tags, which can be used for 
embedding.  It should not occupy a lot of space because 
the amount of data that can be stored on a tag is very 
limited.  
2. Secret Pattern Generation: The inputs for generating the 
watermark should be available on the tag itself.  
3. Embedding Locations: The secret pattern should be 
embedded in the serial number partition.  
4. Data Recovery: The algorithm should be able to recover 
tampered data after data tampering has been confirmed 
using TamDetect. 
5. Plug-n-Play Architecture: The proposed solution should 
be designed such that it can be easily plugged into existing 
RFID middleware applications.  
C. Design Rationale for ResTamp Solution 
The theoretical foundation for ResTamp is proposed to 
satisfy the requirements outlined above. The following design 
decisions are proposed in this solution.  
1. The size of the secret pattern is limited to fifty two bits and 
additional error correction bits (e). Assuming each bit is 
embedded in the one RFID tag; ResTamp would at least 
require [52+e] RFID tags. The 52bits represent the 28 bits 
from EM, 24 bits from OC. (Req. 1) 
2. The secret pattern is generated from the data stored in the 
EM and OC. (Req. 2) 
3. The secret pattern is embedded in the serial number 
partition because it offers enough bits (36 bits), which can 
be used for embedding. (Req. 3)  
4. The secret pattern would be extracted from the set of 
RFID tags, to recover the tampered data. (Req. 4) 
5. The algorithm is designed as a component; hence, it can be 
easily plugged into any existing middleware application. 
(Req. 5) 
We now discuss the theoretical foundation for ResTamp. 
 
V. THEORETICAL FOUNDATION FOR PROPOSED DATA 
RECOVERY SCHEME – RESTAMP  
The proposed framework is shown in Fig. 4, 5 and 6. It can 
be decomposed in four different stages:  
1. Secret Pattern Generation 
 
Fig. 3 RFID Middleware Architecture with Tamper Detection Facility 
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2. Selecting the Embedding Location 
3. Secret Pattern Embedding  
4. Secret Pattern Extraction for Data Recovery 
 
A. Secret Pattern Generation 
Inputs EPC Manager (EM), or Object Class (OC) 
Outputs Secret Pattern (Sf) 
 
Step 1: Secret Pattern Generation 
The secret pattern is generated as shown in Fig. 4. One 
instance of EM and OC, which is uniform across a given 
product category, is encoded using error correction codes 
(ECC) to offer additional level of security and also helps in 
recovery of tampered data. EM introduces an extra ‘b’ bits 
along with 28bits and OC introduces another ‘a’ bits along 
with 24bits. Error control encoding helps in recovering lost 
information in communication systems. The ECC is mostly 
useful in case the SN in some RFID tags is tampered. In 
that case, the resulting secret pattern would be incorrect and 
hence ECC would be required to regenerate the lost 
information from a completely tampered RFID tag. Once 
the secret pattern is generated, we have to identify the 
location for embedding. We now discuss how we select the 
appropriate location for embedding the secret pattern.  
B. Selecting the Embedding Location 
Previously, we mentioned that the secret pattern (Sf) should 
be embedded in the serial number partition of the RFID tag. In 
this section, we give the reason for this selection.  
The basic principle of steganography (or information hiding) 
is that we need some redundant space within the host signal 
which can be modified to embed the secret pattern. In this case, 
the RFID tag is the host signal and we want to identify the 
redundant space. In order to do this, we investigated the RFID 
data structure. 
On the basis of that investigation, we determined that the 
serial number partition within the RFID tags can offer a 
reasonable amount of redundant space for embedding the 
fragile watermark. This selection is attributed to the following 
facts: 
The Header, is fully used for identifying the EAN.UCC key 
and the partitioning scheme. Hence, there is no redundant 
space, so there is no possibility for embedding the fragile 
watermark.  
The EPC Manager, is used to identify the manufacturer 
uniquely. Hence, this partition also does not offer any 
redundant space for embedding because it might be decided by 
the industry standard and the manufacturer has least control 
over this. 
The Object Class, is used to identify the product 
manufactured by the manufacturer. It may follow some product 
convention taxonomy where the first two digits might represent 
the classification of that product; the next two may be the age 
of product and so on. Hence, modifying any of this data might 
interfere with the existing industry standard. As a result, this 
partition also does not offer enough room for embedding the 
watermark. 
The Serial Number, which is the last partition, is used to 
uniquely identify an item, which belongs to a particular Object 
Class. It is orthogonal to the first three partitions and can be 
decided by the manufacturer at will, without violating any 
existing industry standards.  Consequently, it offers enough 
redundant space to embed the secret pattern. Meanwhile, the 
length of this partition is 36 bits (in EPC96) which offers 
enough room to accommodate the secret pattern. Thus, this 
becomes the most appropriate candidate for embedding the 
watermark, and hence, we decided to choose this partition for 
embedding. We now discuss the embedding and extraction 
algorithm in detail.  
C. Secret Pattern Embedding 
Inputs Serial Number (SN) 
Secret Pattern (Sf) 
Number of RFID Tags (N) 
Length of Secret Pattern (n) 
Number of bits embedded in one tag (M) 
Embedding Locations (L) 
Parity Bit Location (P) 
Outputs Tamper Proof RFID Tag (W) 
 
Step 1: Load the Secret Pattern 
In the first step, the RFID reader loads the secret pattern in 
its memory. The secret pattern Sf is can be generated by the 
RFID reader or by the RFID middleware. We assume that 
the reader has the functionality to generate this.  
Step 2: Select the embedding location within the serial 
number partition 
The SN partition has 36 bits; we select m+1 consecutive 
bits from the SN partition, where (0<m<36), to embed the 
first M bits of the secret pattern. We express this location in 
the SN as L. The extra bit is used as a parity bit to check 
whether the secret pattern has changed after embedding.  
Step 3: Append Parity Bit 
EM 28 bits OC 24 bits 
Error 
Correction 
Coding (ECC)  
Encoded  
OC 24 bits   
+ a ECC bits 
Error 
Correction 
Coding (ECC)  
Encoded  
EM 28 bits   
+ b ECC bits 
Secret Pattern  
Fig. 4 Secret Pattern Generation 
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In this step an even parity bit is appended in the next RFID 
tag i.e. N+1. For example, if the secret pattern is 3 bits in 
length (101) then we append a 0 to make it 1010. However 
the last bit i.e. ‘0’, is embedded in the (N+1)th   RFID tag. 
This provides additional security. 
Step 4: Embedding the first set of secret pattern 
The m bits of the secret pattern are now embedded in the 
SN partition of the RFID tag. The process of embedding the 
secret pattern is shown in Fig. 5.  
 
 
Fig. 5 shows the process of embedding the secret pattern in 
multiple RFID tags. Here we assume that the length of the 
secret pattern is 66 bits. 52 (28+24) bits are inputs to ECC, 
which results in 66 ((28+a) + (14+b)) bits output, where a + b 
=14 bits. The ECC output 66 bits (14 bits more than the input 
EM and OC) helps in recovering tampered bits in SN. The sum 
(a + b) can be increased to increase the number of tampered 
bits that could be recovered. We also consider the total number 
of RFID tags to be 33 in this case, hence we embed two secret 
bits in each RFID tag. The parity bit of the first RFID tag is 
embedded in the second RFID tag and so on. Similarly the 
parity bit of the last RFID tag is embedded in the first RFID 
tag.  This is how the secret pattern is embedded in the tag. We 
now explain the data recovery algorithm. 
D. Secret Pattern Extraction for Data Recovery  
Inputs Serial Number (SN) 
Embedding Location (L) 
Parity Locations (P) 
Outputs Tampered Data Recovered 
 
Step 1: Check for SN tampering 
The first task is to check whether the secret pattern 
embedded in the SN is tampered or not. To check this we 
first look for even parity.  
 IF even parity exists in all the tags, we conclude that the 
SN partition in the RFID tag has not been tampered.  
         Proceed to the next step 
 ELSE IF the parity does not exist in one of the RFID 
tags we rely on Error Correction Coding.  
Error Correction Coding would fix these errors to a certain 
extent, depending upon how many bits are used for ECC.  
         Proceed to the next step 
Step 2: Generate the Secret Pattern 
Based on the extracted bits, recover the secret bits using 
ECC coding.  
Step 3: Provide the recovered data 
In this step, compare the extracted secret bits with the EM 
and OC, since data tampering has already been detected, 
rewrite the RFID tags with the recovered data.  
 
The process of data recovery from tampered RFID tag is 
shown in Fig. 6.  
VI. DISCUSSION AND VALIDATION 
In this paper, we proposed a solution to recover data from 
tampered RFID tags. This was achieved by embedding a secret 
pattern in a group of RFID tags, which were attached to a 
consignment carrying one group of products. We showed how 
we can generate the secret pattern using EM and OC and 
embed that in SN. The proposed solution has many advantages; 
it is not only used for data recovery, but can also be used for 
secret communication. For example, this approach can be used 
to embed some other kind of information like invoice data or 
any other information that has to be shared between two 
communicating parties exchanging a consignment.  
As long as the serial number has not been tampered with, the 
proposed technique can exactly recover the tampered data, 
which in this case is the EM and OC.  But if the SN is 
tampered, to match the SN of another product (with lower 
transport cost), we recommend that the manufacturer should 
 
Fig. 5 Secret Pattern Embedding Algorithm 
 
 
Fig. 6 Secret Pattern Extraction Algorithm 
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follow a standard whereby the first n bits from the SN would 
be uniform across all its product range. These n bits would then 
be used for data recovery using information hiding or 
steganography. Thus we can recover data in case the SN is also 
tampered.  
 
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
In this paper, we proposed a solution to recover data from 
tampered RFID tag. We found the majority of recent research 
work in RFID security has been done in the areas of 
anonymity, confidentiality and authenticity. Data integrity and 
data recovery has not been tackled in detail. Hence, we 
proposed a data recovery framework by introducing a layer 
into existing RFID middleware architecture. We also provided 
a detailed description of the data recovery algorithm, which 
can recover the tampered RFID data i.e. EM and OC.  
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